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NOTE
Uninsured Motorist Coverage Laws:
The Problem of the Underinsured Motorist
I. Introduction
Following World War II, the United States experienced a tremendous in-
crease in the number of automobiles traveling its roads and highways. I This in-
flux of automobiles resulted in a greater number of people suffering personal
injuries in traffic accidents. A problem often arose when injured motorists
sought to recover damages for injuries caused by negligent motorists. Fre-
quently, a trial court would award damages to an injured party only to find
that the negligent party could not meet the financial burden of the judgment.
2
Thus, the injured party received little or no compensation. With an increase in
accidents, this problem presented itself more and more not only to the victim-
ized public, but also to the judiciary and legislatures.
Several different attempts have been made at solving the problem of the
financially irresponsible motorist. This note will briefly describe these attempts
and point out gaps that presently exist in them. An in-depth examination will
then be made of uninsured motorist insurance which evolved to improve upon
earlier approaches. This system, however, is not without its problems.
II. The Financially Irresponsible Motorist-Attempted Solutions
One attempted solution to the financially irresponsible motorist problem
makes compulsory the possession of automobile insurance. Massachusetts was
the first state to adopt this approach, in 1927. 3 A typical statute4 provides that
no motor vehicle can be registered in the state unless the application for
registration is accompanied by a "certificate." The certificate is given by an
insurance company stating that it will insure the applicant for registration of
the motor vehicle with respect to that motor vehicle.
A number of problems, however, inhere in this solution. First of all,
nothing prevents an irresponsible motorist from acquiring the insurance in ac-
cord with the laws and then permitting it to lapse. Second, a responsible
operator might have insurance at the time of the accident, but the insurance
company might deny coverage under a condition subsequent. 5 Finally, a
motorist may drive simply without registering the car while he has no in-
1 Comment, An Examination of the Meaning and Scope of the Basis of the UninsuredMotorist Policy Endorsement:
"All Sums the Insured Is Legally Entitled to Recover, " 53 MARQ. L. REv. 320 (1970).
2 Soich, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Past, Present and Future, 6 DuQ. U. L. REv. 341 (1968).
3 1 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LiABILIrY INSURANCE 5 1.01, at 1-5 (rev. ed. 1979).
4 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 5 1A (1975).
5 Automobile liability policies ordinarily contain an express provision requiring the insured, if
a claim is made or suit is brought against him, to forward immediately to the insurance company
every demand, notice, summons, or other process received by him or his representative.
If an automobile liability insurance policy expressly makes the insured's failure to comply
with a forwarding of papers provision a ground of forfeiture, or makes his compliance a condition
precedent to liability, the insured loses his right of action by his failure to forward the suit papers
to the insurer.
14 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:198-99 (2d ed. 1965).
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surance. In all of these cases, the victims remain uncompensated if the
negligent motorist is otherwise financially unable to compensate the injured
party.
A second attempted solution requires posting security bond with the state.
The bond is a condition precedent to the lawful operation of a motor vehicle
within the state. In 1957, North Carolina adopted this scheme. 6 Before a per-
son can operate a car within the state, he is required to give proof of financial
responsibility. To constitute adequate proof, the bond must be filed with the
Commission of Motor Vehicles and be from an authorized surety company.
Gaps exist which make this solution inadequate, also. For example, once a
bond is posted and the owner of the motor vehicle is registered to operate the
vehicle in the state, there is no practical sanction to compel the operator to keep
up the bond. Or, an owner may simply fail to obtain a license for his vehicle,
and drive anyway. As a result, the victims of an accident with the uninsured re-
main uncompensated and the purpose for the statute is defeated.
A third possible answer to the dilemma posed by a negligent motorist who
is not financially able to compensate his victims is uninsured motorist
coverage.
Uninsured motorist coverage appeared in the mid-1950's as a gap filler.
In 1955, insurance companies offered liability insurance endorsements which
provided certain benefits for injuries caused by uninsured motorists. 7 In that
same year, the National Bureau of Underwriters promulgated the standard
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. 8 As a result of this activity, states initiated
legislation requiring insurance companies to offer uninsured motorist coverage
with every automobile liability policy issued within the state. Such laws now
exist in virtually every state. 9
Uninsured motorist coverage is an agreement between the insured and his
own insurance company. The company agrees to protect the insured if he is in-
jured in an automobile accident, the losses from which, because of the
negligent motorist's lack of insurance coverage, would otherwise be un-
compensated. 10
This coverage avoids problems unaffected by requiring compulsory
automobile liability insurance or the posting of a bond as a condition precedent
to the operation of a motor vehicle. The injured party carries the insurance
himself. The insured may recover when injured by any financially irresponsi-
ble motorist. Thus, he is not left uncompensated when the tortfeasor defies the
law and drives without purchasing any insurance or allows his coverage to
lapse. For these reasons, uninsured motorist coverage presents a viable solu-
tion to fill the gap untouched by either of the first two solutions.
III. Analysis of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Uninsured motorist coverage is unusual as compared to other forms of in-
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1978).
7 Comment, supra note 1, at 324.
8 Id.
9 2 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 17.01, at 17-4 (rev. ed. 1979).
10 Symposium-Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 319 (1970).
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surance underwriting. The insurance company writing the coverage is insuring
an undesirable and unknown risk: a financially irresponsible motorist. Another
oddity involved in uninsured motorist coverage concerns the relationship be-
tween the insured and his carrier. Normally the victim and his carrier join
together in suit against the tortfeasor and his carrier. Under this unique
coverage, the victim is forced to pursue his claim against his own insurance
company. By the very nature of the coverage, parties to a friendly contractual
agreement, freely entered into, become adversaries." Despite the unusual
nature of such coverage, it thrives as a solution to the problem of the uninsured
motorist.
Currently, uninsured motorist coverage is statutorily required to be of-
fered by every automobile insurance carrier in almost every state. 12 As with
most insurance, uninsured motorist insurance is solely a statutory creation.
Thus, the importance of statutory construction is essential to analysis of this
coverage. Most of the statutes now in force share three common elements.
First, every statute compels every domestic automobile insurance carrier to
make uninsured motorist coverage available within the state.13 In addition, the
statutes'4 establish a minimum dollar limitation for coverage in one of two
ways. 15 Either a specific limit is expressly set in the statute, or provisions
delegate this authority to some state agency. Finally, the statutes allow the in-
sured, at his option, the right to reject this protection and assume for himself
the risk of sustaining noncompensable injuries.1 6 These three elements,
however, do not solve all construction problems.
Uncertainty in the construction of uninsured motorist coverage, begin-
ning in the mid-1960's, became a problem. Statutes providing that the insured
would be protected if he were "entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . ."t7 posed problems. In its ordinary
sense, the term "uninsured" would encompass only those instances when the
tortfeasor had no insurance at all. Imaginative attorneys and flexible courts,
however, have not construed "uninsured" in this manner. "Uninsured" has
not been limited to the negligent motorist who carried no insurance at all. The
concept includes cases in which the tortfeasor is "underinsured."18
A tortfeasor, generally, can be "underinsured" in three ways. The first is
illustrated as follows: the State of X requires that all motorists carry automobile
liability insurance of $10,000 per victim, up to a total of $20,000 for any acci-
dent ($10,000/$20,000). Driver P is injured in an accident caused by the
negligence of driver D. P's injuries amount to $7,500. D carries automobile in-
surance in the amount of $5,000/$10,000. As obligated under its policy with D,
D's insurance company pays P $5,000. Thus, P's recovery from D is less than
the injury amount. For purposes of this note, this scenario represents a "Type
11 Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist Defined, 16 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV. 504 (1967).
12 SCHERMER, supra note 9.
13 Id.
14 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Page Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, 5 2000 (Purdon
1971).
15 Id.
16 SCHERMER, supra note 9.
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2000 (Purdon 1971).
18 See text accompanying notes 19-72 infra.
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A" case. In this case, D's coverage was less than the statutory minimum and
P's injuries were greater than D's policy limits but less than the statutory
limitation.
In the same State of X, with minimum statutory requirements of
$10,000/$20,000, P is involved in an accident caused by the negligence of D,
and P is awarded $25,000 in damages. D carries insurance which meets the
minimum amounts required, $10,000/$20,000. D's insurance company pays P
$10,000, which does not compensate for P's injuries. For purposes of this note,
this fact pattern represents a "Type B" case. In this case, D's coverage met the
statutory minimum, but P's injuries were greater than the minimum limits.
In State X, once more, D carries insurance meeting the minimum
statutory requirements $10,000/$20,000. His negligence results in an accident
causing injuries to P1, P2, and P3. P's injuries are found to be $7,000.
However, D's insurance company only offers P, $5,000. It has paid P 2 and P3
each $7,500 and has a remaining policy obligation of only $5,000. For purposes
of this note, this scenario represents a "Type C" case. D's coverage met the
statutory minimum, but P's injuries were greater than the amount available to
him due to amounts paid to other injured claimants.
In all these cases, the relevant question is: when does an "underinsured"
motorist become an "uninsured" motorist for purposes of uninsured motorist
coverage?
A. Type A Cases
Type A cases manifest themselves in one of two ways. Tortfeasor D could
be a resident of State X and merely fail to obtain adequate insurance as re-
quired by the state. On the other hand, D could be a resident of another state,
Y, where the minimum statutory requirements are less than they are in X.
Thus D could meet the requirements of his home state Y yet fall short of the re-
quirements of the state where the accident occurred, X.
A general rule has developed over the past fifteen years, holding a tort-
feasor who carries less insurance for automobile liability than is required by
state law to be an "uninsured" motorist for the purposes of uninsured motorist
coverage. 19 The primary rationale behind this rule was expressed by the
Missouri Court of Appeals in Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 20 where the insured's daughter was struck by a Type A motorist. Accord-
ing to the Missouri court, the legislature's purpose in enacting the uninsured
motorist statute was to make available the minimum statutory coverage to each
injured party. By finding the tortfeasor "uninsured" and allowing the injured
party to recover from her own carrier, the court fulfilled this purpose. Unin-
sured motorist provisions should, according to the court, "give the same pro-
tection to the person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have had if
he had been injured in an accident caused by an automobile covered by a stan-
dard liability policy (i.e., one that meets the statutory minimum)."
'2'
19 SCHERMER, supra note 9, § 22.04 at 22-6.
20 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
21 Id. at 151.
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Type A cases, in which coverage is less than the statutory minimum, fall
into two groups, depending upon whether "uninsured motorist" is statutorily
defined or not. In some jurisdictions, the term "uninsured motorist" has not
been defined statutorily. The courts, nonetheless, have found reasons to in-
clude "underinsured" within that term.2 2 In other jurisdictions, where the
term "uninsured motorist" has been defined by the legislatures, courts have
included "underinsured" within the term "uninsured" although the Type A
motorist may not fall explicitly within the definition.2
3
1. No Statutory Definition
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fusco, 24 Allstate had delivered a policy providing
automobile insurance to Ralph Fusco. The policy provided that Allstate pay
Fusco all sums to which he would be legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile. Fusco was killed while a
passenger in a car operated by Baumgardner, who was insured up to $5,000 for
injury to one person, and $10,000 for any accident. Allstate's uninsured policy
provisions with Fusco provided limits of $10,000/$20,000 which coincided with
the state's minimum statutory requirements. Fusco's wife claimed that
Baumgardner was uninsured and, as a consequence, that Allstate must pay her
$5,000, the difference between Baumgardner's policy and the minimum
statutory requirement. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed.
The court based its decision on several grounds. It concluded that the
legislative history suggested that statutes dealing with uninsured motorist
coverage in Rhode Island must, as a matter of public policy, be construed to in-
clude any difference between liability insurance carried by the tortfeasor and
the minimum limits mandated by the legislature. In response to Allstate's
argument that out-of-state decisions relied on statutory definitions of uninsured
automobiles, the court said, "the distinctions upon which Allstate relies are
based on syntax rather than substance.' '25 The court held that a statutory
definition was not required to find Baumgardner uninsured. It concluded that
Baumgardner was operating an uninsured automobile to the extent that the
bodily insurance limits carried by him were less than the $10,000/$20,000
mandated by the Rhode Island General Assembly. A similar ruling was made
by the same court five years later.
26
2. Statutory Definition
Where "uninsured motorist" is defined by statute, a number of courts
have decided that a Type A motorist is uninsured. This result has been reached
where a Type A motorist is clearly within the definition, as in Cruzado v. Under-
wood.27 However, the result has been the same even though the Type A
22 See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 27-38 infra.
24 101 R.I. 350, 223 A.2d 447 (1966).
25 Id. at 354, 223 A.2d at 451.
26 Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971).
27 39 Misc. 2d 859, 242 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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motorist may not fall explicitly within the definition as announced by the
legislature. 28 In Cruzado v. Underwood29 Cruzado sued Underwood in New York
for personal injuries caused by Underwood's negligent driving in New York.
Underwood, a resident of Rhode Island, was insured for $5,000/$10,000, in
conformity with the requirements of Rhode Island. At the time, New York law
set the minimum at $10,000/$20,000. The sole issue was whether the defen-
dant's automobile would be recognized as an "uninsured motor vehicle"
under the New York statute.
The court's holding that Underwood's automobile was an "uninsured
motor vehicle" under New York law was arrived at by statutory analysis. New
York insurance law defined an "insured motor vehicle" as one to which there
was maintained proof of financial security.3 0 "Uninsured motor vehicles"
were all other motor vehicles. "Proof of financial security" was "proof of the
ability to respond in damages for liability arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as evidenced by an owner's policy of
liability insurance." ' 31 An "owner's policy of liability insurance" afforded
coverage meeting the minimum provisions set by regulation. At the time, the
superintendent of insurance set the minimums at $10,000/$20,000. Despite
compliance with Rhode Island law, Underwood was found uninsured for pur-
poses of New York law and thus, the court allowed Cruzado to recover from his
own company. Later cases in New York have followed this analysis.
3 2
Even where the statutory definition of"uninsured motor vehicle" appears
to exclude an underinsured vehicle, courts have included underinsured within
the meaning of uninsured because of the belief that it more accurately reflects
the legislature's intent. In Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 33 Taylor,
a Californian, was injured in a collision on a California highway with a car
registered and insured in Texas. The bodily injury liability insurance carried
by the Texas driver had maximum limits of only $5,000 for injury to one per-
son. Taylor, suffering injuries in excess of $5,000, asserted a claim against his
insurance company under its uninsured motorist clause. His insurer denied
liability. At the time, California required coverage limits for uninsured
motorists to be at least equal to those required by the financial responsibility
law, i.e., $10,000 for injury to one person. An "uninsured motor vehicle" was
defined as one to which "there is no bodily injury liability insurance . .
applica[ble] at the time of the accident.' '34
The California District Court of Appeals construed the definition of
"uninsured motor vehicle" to define as uninsured "a vehicle carrying in-
surance or bond in limits less than the financial responsibility requirements of
the Vehicle Code." 3 5 It believed this construction more nearly approached the
28 See text accompanying notes 33-38 infra.
29 39 Misc. 2d 859, 242 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
30 Id. at 860, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
31 Id.
32 Lunger v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 38 A.D.2d 857, 330 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 1972);
Buglione v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 32 A.D.2d 525, 299 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div.
1969).
33 225 Cal. App. 2d 80, 37 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
34 Id. at 81-82, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
35 Id. at 82, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
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legislature's intent, which was to fill the gap in financial responsibility law
"which, although it provides minimum coverage requirements, in fact comes
into operation only after the first accident caused by an irresponsible
motorist.' '36 The victim of this first accident would be uncompensated. As the
court said, "the declared ... policy of this state is to give monetary protection
to those who . . . suffer injury through negligent use of the highways by
others." 3 7 To fulfill this policy, they found the tortfeasor uninsured. This posi-
tion was reaffirmed in a later California case.
3 8
3. Amount of Recovery
When a court decides that a motorist is "uninsured" under Type A for
any reason, the amount of recovery for the insured becomes important. Taylor,
Cruzado and Fusco represent the majority view. 3 9 Assume that D has insurance
of $5,000/$10,000 and the state requirement is $10,000/$15,000. If D
negligently injures P, P is entitled to recover $5,000 under his own uninsured
motorist coverage. This represents the difference between $10,000 (statutory
minimum) and $5,000 (D's insurance coverage for liability). $5,000 is the ex-
tent of recovery even if P's injuries are greater than the statutory minimum.
The amount of recovery was determined differently in White v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Co.40 There, a negligent motorist, with coverage of only
$10,000 per person, was found to be uninsured. The applicable Virginia
statute declared that a vehicle was uninsured if it was covered by less than
$15,000 (the statutory minimum) insurance for a single person. 41 The district
court awarded plaintiff a $22,000 judgment for injuries against the negligent
motorist, and ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to collect $12,000 under the
uninsured motorist endorsement. The insurance company appealed the ruling
to the extent that the award exceeded the statutory minimum of $15,000, less
the $10,000 recovery under the tortfeasor's policy. The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, ruling that the insured's carrier's exposure for uninsured motorist
coverage could not be reduced by the negligent driver's insurance coverage.
The court of appeals realized that its decision was contrary to decisions in
other jurisdictions. However, the court, bound by earlier state court decisions,
followed the precedent set in Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 42 which had set out Virginia law. In other states, according to the court,
the purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes was to provide protection only
up to the minimum statutory limits for injuries caused by financially irrespon-
sible motorists. The design of the statutes, therefore, was not to give greater
protection than would have been available had the insured been injured by an
operator insured up to the minimum statutory limits. This meant recovery
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Calhoun v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal. App. 2d 407, 62 Cal. Rptr. 177 (Ct. App.
1967).
39 See text accompanying notes 24-38 supra.
40 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966).
41 VA. CODE §§ 38.1-381(c), 46.1-1(8) (Supp. 1964).
42 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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under the uninsured motorist coverage of the difference between the statutory
minimum and the amount of insurance the tortfeasor actually had.
In Bryant, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held the recovery
limit under an uninsured motorist policy would be the amount of the insured's
judgment against the uninsured motorist. The court said Virginia law required
that the insured be paid all sums which he was legally entitled to. The statute
contained no limitations or qualification that the recovery amount be reduced
by the wrongdoer's insurance policy. Utilizing this principle, the circuit court
awarded plaintiff $12,000 under her uninsured motorist endorsement.
When a tortfeasor has bodily liability insurance in amounts less than re-
quired by statute, he will generally be considered "uninsured. ,43 The amount
of recovery the insured may have is usually the difference between the financial
responsibility law and the tortfeasor's policy amount. 44 The result is the same
whether the court has a statutory definition of "uninsured motorist" or not.
White suggests another approach in determining recovery amount but it stands
alone. Although its result is arguably desirable, few other courts have seen fit to
follow White's reasoning.
B. Type B Cases
Whether an "underinsured" motorist can be considered "uninsured"
also arises in the situation where the tortfeasor carries insurance and even
meets the requirements of a state's financial responsibility law. The problem
remains if the tortfeasor's insurance is not sufficient to compensate the injured
party for all of his injuries. This is a Type B case.
45
Taft v. Sweeney46 is a leading Type B case. In Taft, Taft was injured by
Sweeney who had liability coverage of $15,000/$30,000. This met the
minimum amounts required by New Jersey law. Pursuant to its obligations,
Sweeney's insurance company paid $15,000 to Taft. Taft, however, sought ad-
ditional recovery under his uninsured motorist provisions. He contended that
Sweeney was uninsured to the extent that Sweeney's policy limits were inade-
quate to compensate him fully for the injuries he suffered. The case turned on
the interpretation of "uninsured" in the New Jersey statute, 47 which required
the insurance company to pay all sums which the insured could recover from
the owner of an "uninsured" automobile.
The Superior Court of New Jersey* ruled against Taft. Sweeney had been
insured up to the statutory minimum and the court found nothing in the statute
suggesting that uninsured motorist coverage should be available as excess in-
surance. A policy which met the statutory minimum limits of coverage did not
render the owner uninsured merely because it proved an inadequate source of
compensation for the injured party. As the court stated, "the essential require-
ment for such coverage is lack of insurance, not inadequate insurance.' '48 The
43 See text accompanying notes 24-38 supra.
44 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
45 See text following note 18 supra.
46 149 NJ. Super. 282, 373 A.2d 712 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (West Supp. 1979).
48 149 N.J. Super. 282, 285; 373 A.2d 712, 713 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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legislative intent was to guarantee an available source of recovery up to the
statutory minimum and this intent was fulfilled.
The court in Detrick v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 49 used different reason-
ing to reach the same result as Taft. Instead of relying upon legislative intent
and statutory interpretation, the Detrick court looked to the language of the
uninsured motorist insurance policy to reach its conclusion. Numerous items,
appearing in the relevant insurance sections, were defined as "words of com-
mon meaning and understanding in accord with dictionary definitions.' '50
"Underinsurance" was defined as "insurance in an amount insufficient to
cover the possible loss or to satisfy the requirements of a coinsurance clause.' '15
"Un" was said to be a prefix meaning "not." 5 2 With reference to these defini-
tions the court said the policy was not ambiguous. It added that no authority in
the policy existed defining the word "uninsured" to mean "underinsured" in
relation to this plaintiff's situation. Finding only one possible construction, the
court held that the tortfeasor did not fall into the "uninsured" category.
As a general principle, when a wrongdoer carries insurance in compliance
with the minimum statutory limits, but such insurance is inadequate to com-
pensate the injured party, courts uniformly refuse to classify the underinsured
tortfeasor as uninsured. 53 Whether they rely on statutory interpretation, in-
cluding legislative history, or' exegesis of the policy, the result is properly the
same.
C. Type C Cases
Type C cases represent the scenario where D carries insurance meeting
the minimum statutory requirements, of say $10,000/$20,000. His negligence
results in an accident causing injuries to P, P 2 and P3. P,'s injuries are found
to be $7,000. However, D's insurance company only offers P, $5,000. It has
paid P2 and P3 each $7,500 and has a remaining policy obligation of only
$5,000. Because the proceeds of D's insurance will be divided among the in-
jured claimants, a party may receive less than his damage amount. In such a
situation it has been argued that the underinsured motorist, D, should be con-
sidered uninsured, even though he meets the minimum statutory limits.
In Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co. 54 the Arizona Supreme
Court determined that a Type C motorist is uninsured. Porter had been in an
accident in which he and four others were injured. The wrongdoer had
$10,000/$20,000 liability coverage as required by the Arizona Financial
Responsibility Act.5 5 Porter received a $10,000 judgment and then entered into
a proposed settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance company. He was to
receive $2,500 of the $20,000 of insurance proceeds available for allocation
among the injured parties. This amount was all that remained after payments
were made to the other injured parties. Porter brought suit against his own
49 261 Iowa 1246, 158 N.W.2d 99 (1968).
50 Id. at 1253, 158 N.W.2d at 104.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 SCHERMER, supra note 9, § 22.04 at 22-7.
54 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d 258 modified, 106 Ariz. 345, 476 P.2d 155 (1970).
55 ARZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 28-1170, subsec. B, para. 2 (1976).
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uninsured motorist carrier for the difference between the $10,000 minimum
protection afforded by the Act and the $2,500 received. The Arizona Supreme
Court awarded him the difference.
The Porter court's reasoning had two aspects. First, the court contrasted
the theoretical with the actual. Theoretically, because the wrongdoer carried
the minimum amount of insurance, insurance proceeds in the amount of
$10,000 were available to Porter. However, the court contrasted this figure
with the actual coverage upon which Porter could rely and found a great
disparity. The court said that to find the tortfeasor insured in this instance and
deny Porter recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage would be to leave
Porter as they found him, "grossly uninsured against irresponsible motorists
despite his attempt to insure himself against such a contingency and contrary to
the intention of the Legislature.' '56 The Arizona court refused to do so.
Secondly, the Porter court desired to avoid an undesirable logical conse-
quence of the contrary holding. If the court had ruled against Porter here, he
would have received greater compensation had the tortfeasor had no insurance
at all. In that instance, no doubt would have existed that the tortfeasor had
been uninsured. Porter could have received a full $10,000 from his own com-
pany: To have the injured party fare better financially when the tortfeasor is
uninsured, than when the tortfeasor is insured up to the minimum statutory
limits, would be an inequitable result.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii in Palisbo v. Hawaiian Insurance and Guaranty
Co. 57 agreed with Porter. Palisbo, Ramos and two others were passengers in a
car operated by Clemente. Clemente's negligent driving resulted in injury to
the passengers in the automobile. Palisbo and Ramos filed suit against
Clemente and were awarded $30,000 and $42,027.21, respectively. Clemente
was insured by State Farm in the statutory minimum amount of $10,000 and
$20,000. The insurance company filed an interpleader in the circuit court. The
court awarded $6,000 to Palisbo, $6,500 to Ramos and $7,500 to the other in-
jured parties.
Palisbo and Ramos at the time of the accident were covered by uninsured
motorist provisions. Their policies provided for recovery up to
$10,000/$20,000. Both filed suit against their own carriers to recover under
these policies, claiming that Clemente was uninsured. The trial court agreed
and ordered their companies to pay. Palisbo received $4,000 ($10,000-6,000)
and Ramos $3,500 ($10,000-6,500).
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed. The court ruled that
the Uninsured Motorist Statute was designed to enable the purchaser to assure
himself of not less than the minimum protection provided for in the financial
responsibility law. To deny Palisbo and Ramos recovery here would be to
defeat this legislative purpose. The court relied on Porter and said that it most
closely expressed the intent of Hawaii's legislature in enacting the uninsured
motorist law. Construing the statute liberally, as was done in Porter to achieve
the "remedial purposes and legislative intent,"' 58 the court held that "for at
56 106 Ariz. 274, 279; 475 P.2d 258, 263 (1970).
57 57 Haw. 10, 547 P.2d 1350 (1976).
58 Id. at 15, 547 P.2d at 1354.
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least the minimum amounts specified by ... law, the tortfeasor is . . . unin-
sured to the extent of the insufficiency for the purposes of the statute." 59 The
amount of recovery allowed by the Hawaiian court was equal to the difference
between the amount the insured received from tortfeasor's insurance and the
face value of his uninsured motorist policy.
Porter and Palisbo are the leading Type C cases holding that underinsured
means uninsured. Almost all the other jurisdictions that have addressed this
question have held to the contrary. 60 Simonette v. Great American Insurance Co. 61
typifies this majority viewpoint.
J.P. Simonette, Jr. and Carroll were passengers in an automobile driven
by Good. Due to Good's negligence, the car crashed, killing Simonette, Jr. and
Carroll. Good's automobile insurance policy, issued by Safeco Insurance
Company, insured him to $20,000 for each person and up to $20,000 for each
accident. Safeco paid $10,000 to the Simonette estate and $10,000 to Carroll's
estate. The damages however for the wrongful death of Simonette, Jr. exceed-
ed $10,000. Simonette, the administrator of Simonette Jr.'s estate, had an in-
surance policy covering his son which provided uninsured motorist coverage of
$20,000/$20,000. He claimed, as administrator, that the estate was entitled to
$10,000, the difference between the $20,000 uninsured motorist coverage and
the $10,000 paid by Safeco. He argued that Good was "underinsured" and
that he should be considered "uninsured" for purposes of recovery under the
uninsured motorist policy.
The Connecticut Supreme Court disagreed with Simonette. This court
concluded that Good, although underinsured was not uninsured. Referring to
the statutes, the court found no ambiguity in the term "uninsured." It could
not be construed to mean "underinsured" in relation to the deceased's injury.
As the Derick6 2 court did, the court looked at the defined meaning of the term
"uninsured" in the policy and said it could not mean "underinsured."
Although the injured party would "be better off' ' 63 if the tortfeasor had ob-
tained no insurance at all, the court said its decision was mandated by the
legislature. It refused to read into the statute something which was manifestly
absent. The court acknowledged the harshness of its conclusion, but adhered to
the strict language of the law. Some courts have been forced to look to the in-
surance policy itself to determine the meaning of "uninsured motor vehicle."
At the time Smiley v. Estate of Toney64 was decided, no Illinois statute defined the
term "uninsured motor vehicle." The Appellate Court of Illinois looked at the
insurance policy itself for the full meaning of the term "uninsured vehicle."
The insurance policy issued to the plaintiff in Smiley provided that, "unin-
sured vehicle means a vehicle with respect to which there is no bodily injury
liability bond or ... insurance policy.' '65 The court found the language of this
policy to be plain, concise and unambiguous. Using the terms in their ordinary
sense, the tortfeasor was not in fact an uninsured motorist.
59 Id.
60 See note 69 infra.
61 165 Conn. 466, 338 A.2d 453 (1973).
62 See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
63 165 Conn. 466, 471; 338 A.2d 453, 456 (1973).
64 44 Il1. 2d 127, 254 N.E.2d 440 (1969).
65 Id. at 130, 254 N.E.2d at 441.
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The Type C issue has also arisen in jurisdictions having statutory defini-
tions of "uninsured motorist or uninsured motor vehicle." In Brake v. MFA
Mutual Insurance Co., 66 Missouri law defined "uninsured motor vehicle" to "in-
clude an insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer ... is unable to make
payment . . . because of insolvency.' '67
This court found that an "underinsured" motorist was not "uninsured."
The terms in the statute68 and insurance policy were terms of common mean-
ing and understanding. The prefix "un" meant "not," and since the tort-
feasor had insurance meeting the statutory minimum, his vehicle was clearly
not uninsured. Under the guise of interpretation, the court also reasoned that it
could not extend the scope of the uninsured motorist law unless the statute
itself provided an exception. The statute in Missouri provided no exception
that would cover Type C cases; therefore, the tortfeasor could not be con-
sidered "uninsured." This rationale has been followed in most other jurisdic-
tions.
69
Generally, courts will not disregard the plain import of the words and
phrases chosen by the state general assembly. A Type C underinsured motorist
will not be deemed uninsured for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage.
Only a few 70 courts have ruled to the contrary. All 71 of the other courts have
decided, for one reason or another, that they will not equate the two terms in a
Type C arrangement.
IV. Conclusion
The era of litigation over "underinsured" motorists is far from over. Peo-
ple, faced with increasing prices and tighter budgets, may feel that automobile
insurance is a "luxury." This, coupled with higher medical costs, larger per-
sonal injury awards and rising premiums for the insurance itself, each year
produces a great number of uninsured and underinsured motorists. Every day
the chances of being injured by a financially irresponsible motorist increase.
When a tortfeasor has no insurance or less that the statutory minimun, the
self-insured can secure some protection, at least up to the statutory minimum,
by purchasing uninsured motorist coverage. This decreases some of the risk in-
volved, but not all since recovery is limited. Most courts feel that what the in-
sured received from the tortfeasor's insurance company should be subtracted
from the statutory minimum to get the amount of recovery. The White72 court
provided greater recovery. There the amount the insured received was not af-
fected by the amount recovered from the tortfeasor's policy. The insured
66 525 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
67 Id. at 111.
68 Mo. REv. STAT. § 379.203 (Vernon 1968).
69 Chafin v. Aetna Ins. Co., 550 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1976); Lund v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
342 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bouzer, 39 Cal. App. 3d 992, 114 Cal. Rptr.
651 (Ct. App. 1974); Golphin v. Home Indem. Co., 284 So.2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cotton
States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 143 Ga. App. 309, 238 S.E.2d 253 (1977); Gorton v. Reliance Ins. Co., 77
N.J. 563, 391 A.2d 1219 (1978); Simmons v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 543 P.2d 1384 (Okla. 1975);
Villareal v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 510 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Kemp v. Fidelity Cas. Co. of
New York, 504 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
70 Guthrie v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1968).
71 Note 69 supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
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recovered to the full extent of his policy. It is doubtful that many courts will
follow this aberration without direction from their state legislatures.
If the tortfeasor has the statutory minimum coverage, as in Type B and
Type C, the injured party faces apparently insurmountable problems. In a
Type B situation there seems to be little recourse. The injured party has re-
ceived the minimum amount of insurance set by the state. If that does not com-
pensate him for his injuries, the problem lies not in the uninsured motorist
coverage. Rather, the minimum amounts set by the state legislature are inade-
quate. This suggests a fairly simple solution in the legislative arena, not a prob-
lem with the adequacy of uninsured motorist coverage as a gap filler.
Type C situations also pose a difficult problem. There has been a split,
however small, between the courts on how to deal with this problem. Porter and
Palisbo represent the minority view, holding it inequitable to deny the insured
recovery when what he receives in insurance from the tortfeasor is far less than
the minimum statutory amount. Other courts have rejected this viewpoint,
suggesting that if there is to be change, it will have to come from the legislature.
Considering the complete rejection by the courts of allowing recovery in a Type
C situation, legislative response seems to present the only answer.
Legislative action in the uninsured motorist area, however, seems unlike-
ly. Although a legislative response clarifying the definition in some areas may
be helpful, a complete revision seems unnecessary. The policy behind unin-
sured motorist coverage is to protect the insured in an accident with the unin-
sured as if the uninsured were, in fact, insured. The courts interpreting the
statutes in light of this policy have come close to that goal. In the hard cases,
Types B and C, the problem lies not with uninsured motorist coverage and a
solution should not be attempted which would result in a change of the basic
uninsured motorist coverage. Those situations should be dealt with by other
means, such as increasing the minimum amount of insurance coverage. Only
in that way can legislatures effect a positive change.
Ralph P. Higgins
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